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Primary care is essential to the effective and efficient
functioning of health care delivery systems, yet there is
an impending crisis in the field due in part to a
dysfunctional payment system. We present a fundamen-
tally new model of payment for primary care, replacing
encounter-based imbursement with comprehensive
payment for comprehensive care. Unlike former itera-
tions of primary care capitation (which simply bundled
inadequate fee-for-service payments), our comprehen-
sive payment model represents new investment in adult
primary care, with substantial increases in payment
over current levels. The comprehensive payment is
directed to practices to include support for the modern
systems and teams essential to the delivery of compre-
hensive, coordinated care. Income to primary physicians
is increased commensurate with the high level of re-
sponsibility expected. To ensure optimal allocation of
resources and the rewarding of desired outcomes, the
comprehensive payment is needs/risk-adjusted and
performance-based. Our model establishes a new social
contractwith the primary care community, substantially
increasing payment in return for achieving important
societal health system goals, including improved acces-
sibility, quality, safety, and efficiency. Attainment of
these goals should help offset and justify the costs of
the investment. Field tests of this and other new models
of payment for primary care are urgently needed.
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INTRODUCTION
Ironically, at the very time definitive data are confirming
primarycare’s essentialcontributionstohealthcare (i.e.,health
status is improved and costs are reduced),
1,2 adult primary care
in the United States finds itself on the brink of crisis.
3 Practicing
primary care physicians are demoralized, retiring early, and
advising others not to go into the field.
3–5 The percentage of
recent U.S. medical school graduates and residents planning to
enter primary care practice is plummeting to levels that will lead
to serious physician shortages.
6–11 The reasons for this decline
are multifactorial,
3–5,7,9,11–23 but a central factor has been a
succession of dysfunctional payment systems that discourage
proper delivery of primary care.
3–5,12,16–18,23–28 We propose a
new payment model for primary care that realigns incentives
and makes possible the establishment and operation of ac-
countable, modern primary care practices capable of providing
the personalized, coordinated, comprehensive care essential to
a well-functioning health care system.
FEATURES OF THE MODEL
A risk/needs-adjusted comprehensive payment would be
made to the primary care practice for the comprehensive care
of each patient. It would replace all encounter-based payments
made to the primary care physician under the resource-based
relative-value scale (RBRVS) system.
29 The payment would be
directed to cover all practice expenses and salaries related to
operating a robust, modern primary care practice (Table 1),
one that would qualify as an “advanced medical home” for
adults, a practice structure that enables efficient provision of
comprehensive, coordinated, patient-centered care.
30–32 In-
cluded would be monies for essential infrastructures and
systems, most importantly, an interoperable electronic health
record with decision support.
33–37 Unlike primary care capita-
tion systems, which also provided an aggregate payment
(Table 2),
38,39 our model’s comprehensive payment would
represent a net investment in primary care practices, not just
the actuarially determined consolidation of inadequate RBRVS
visit payments, as typically occurred under capitation.
24,25,38,39
Total practice revenue would markedly increase compared to
that under RBRVS; over two-thirds would be designated for the
teams and systems essential to improving care (Table 1).
Physician payment would also increase, commensurate with
the responsibility assumed and value created (Table 3).
To encourage quality, safety, efficiency, and patient-centered
care, we propose that a substantial proportion of the compre-
hensive payment (e.g., 15–25%) be performance/outcomes-
based and paid as a bonus for achieving valued outcomes.
Determination of the performance bonus would require con-
sensus goals and use of validated process and outcome
measures agreed upon by payers and the profession (e.g., the
Starter Set recommended by the National Committee on
Quality Assurance).
40
Both the comprehensive payment and the performance
goals for the bonus would need to be risk- and needs-adjusted
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410so as not to penalize practices for taking on the care of high-
risk or psychosocially disadvantaged patients. The adjust-
ments would depend on validated formulas, such as those
using principal diagnoses in determining risk for ambulatory
care
41–44 and those taking into account behaviors, psychoso-
cial factors, and social environment to estimate need.
45 These
formulas would also allow for objective audit to ensure
accuracy of the payment adjustment and discourage abuse.
The expected manifold differences in actuarially determined
care burdens would be reflected in correspondingly scaled
payments; variation might be 10-fold or more between the
highest and lowest risk/needs categories.
Payment would be made monthly to help smooth cash flow
and enable patients to conveniently change primary care
practices. A monthly payment schedule would also underscore
the shift from piece-work reimbursement to 24/7 physician
practice responsibility for patients. Patient copayments for
primary care services could remain, but also might switch
from per-visit payments to an actuarially determined cost-
sharing component of the comprehensive payment, paid as
part of the insurance premium.
The payment reform proposed requires concurrent practice
transformation (i.e., establishment of the “advanced medical
home”) to achieve the necessary savings and improvements in
care. Participation in the comprehensive payment system
would be dependent on demonstration of the requisite struc-
tural and organizational changes. Organizations such as The
National Committee for Quality Assurance are developing
standards and measures for office practices
46 that might be
used to determine eligibility for the comprehensive payment.
Participating practices would be expected to agree to periodic
audit of standards such as these.
Payment for hospital and specialist services and ancillaries
such as medications, laboratory tests, and imaging studies
would remain the responsibility of payers and not the practices
(unlike many prior iterations of primary care capitation, which
placed primary care practices at unacceptable financial
risk.
23–27 Minimizing under- and overutilization of such ser-
vices can be achieved by 1) incorporating evidence-based
guidelines for best practices into the practice’s decision-
support systems,
33–36 and 2) by factoring into the pay-for-
performance bonus calculation the attainment of consensus
goals for cost-effectiveness, efficiency, health outcomes, and
patient-centered care. Savings would be stimulated by encour-
aging best practices and achievement of validated cost-effi-
ciency standards, but not by putting the practice at immediate
financial risk for ordering specific tests on a particular patient
or for the expenditures of other physicians and providers.
An adjustment to the comprehensive payment might need to
be considered when some or all of the responsibility for
comprehensive care is transferred to a specialist, as might
occur in end-stage renal disease or cancer. Under such
circumstances, the specialist might share in or receive the
entire payment. Physicians with a specialty who wish to
provide comprehensive primary care could participate in the
new model if their practices meet advanced medical home
standards. Such participating specialists who also perform
unique procedural or other services that make a referral
unnecessary might be paid an additional reduced fee-for-
service payment under selected circumstances. Similarly,
primary care physicians might be eligible for fee-for-service
reimbursements for some services typically performed by
specialists (e.g., skin biopsy).
Table 1. Sample allocation formula for comprehensive payment
system for adult primary care practice*
Formula for comprehensive payment for adult primary care
· 25%—Physician reimbursement: (250K before bonus and fringe) PCP
reimbursement (all care)
· 60%—Staff, fringe, rent, office expense (assumes hiring of
multidisciplinary office team charged with timely delivery of
personalized comprehensive care): (600K)
Nurse practitioner 100K
Nurse 90K
.5 FTE Nutritionist 35K
.5 FTE Social worker 35K
Receptionist 60K
Medical assistant 50K
Rent 40K
Office expenses 50K
Insurance 50K
Physician fringe 75–90K
· 10% —Information technology/patient safety/quality monitoring
(100K)
Purchase/lease/setup of electronic health record and quality
monitoring system 35K
Data manager 65K
·5 % —Performance bonus, annual meeting mutually established goals
(50k)
*Example assumes an average comprehensive payment of $500/yr/pt,
an average panel size of 2,000 patients/full time primary care physician
and team, 30% fringe benefit unless otherwise specified, and gross
revenue of $1.00 M/full time equivalent primary care physician and
team. Other models possible (see Table 2).
Table 2. Comparison of Comprehensive Payment System with other Modes of Payment for Primary Care
Comprehensive
primary
care payment
FFS FFS+
P4P
Capitation Capitation+
P4P
FFS+monthly
coordination fee
Monthly payment includes all primary care services + –– ++ –
Payment for individual encounters – ++ –– +
Primary care practice at risk for services delivered by others –– – + (usually) + –
Measurement of performance (technical and patient experience) + – + – + –
Obligate probably reporting of performance + –– – – –
Expect total costs of care to decrease + –– ++ ±
Incentive to limit practice size + –– – – –
Incentive to treat complex patients + –– – – +
FFS=fee for service
PFP=pay for performance
411 Goroll et al.: Comprehensive Payment for Comprehensive Adult Primary Care JGIMAs alluded to earlier, installation and operation of an
interoperable electronic health record (EHR) would be an
essential requirement for practices desiring to participate in
the comprehensive payment system, given the EHR’s central
role in transforming primary care practice
30,33–37 and in facili-
tating auditing of care and outcomes. The costs of installation
and operation of such a system are considered a legitimate and
important component of the comprehensive payment (Table 1).
TESTING AND IMPLEMENTING THE MODEL
Pilot studies conducted in a variety of practice settings and
involving a wide spectrum of patients will be needed to validate
the proposed model. These investigations will require the
collaborative efforts of the physician community, payers,
purchasers, and patients, and should utilize an independent
research group for data collection, monitoring, and analysis of
clinical and economic outcomes. Medicare, as the largest payer
and the one whose RBRVS system has been emulated by most
other payers, should take the lead and, ideally, collaborate
with other large payers to permit a true test of the new
payment model.
Demonstration studies will need to address panel size, case
mix, and levels of staffing, factors which affect the amount of
time available and required for patient care activities (whether
office visits, phone calls, record review, or team meetings), key
determinants of patient and professional satisfaction.
21,47 A
range of panel sizes, cases mixes, payment levels, and staffing
levels are possible (see Table 3). No single formula is likely to
suffice for all settings and populations, but the common
denominator needs to be adequate resources to support a
comprehensive primary care effort.
There willbeformidable research design issues, especially for
controlled trials. The first studies might simply test feasibility.
These would provide basic observational data comparing
financial and patient outcomes pre and post change in reim-
bursement and relating those outcomes to the various practice
models and patterns chosen by participating physicians.
Assuming that pilot studies of the model show promise, the
subsequent challenge will be implementation. Most primary care
practices do not have the necessary teams or systems in place;
Table 3. Examples of Possible Comprehensive Payments, Panel Sizes, and Allocations for Participating Adult Primary Care Practices*
Panel size and level of need/risk
2,000
low–medium
(average)
1,250
medium
(above average)
1,500
low–medium
(average)
Ave. risk-
adjusted
comprehensive
payment/
patient
500/yr 800/yr 500/yr
MD
reimbursement
250K 250K 200K
Team and
office staff
salaries
Total=600K Total=600K Total=425K
Nurse practitioner
100K
Nurse practitioner
100K
0.5 Nurse practitioner
50K
Nurse 90K Nurse 90K 0.5 Nurse 45K
.5 FTE nutritionist
35K
.5 FTE nutritionist
35K
Medical assistant
50K
.5 FTE Social worker
35K
.5 FTE Social worker
35K
Receptionist
60K
Receptionist 60K Receptionist 60K Rent 40K
Medical assistant 50K Medical assistant 50K Office expenses 50K
Rent 40K Rent 40K Insurance 50K
Office expenses 50K Office expenses 50K Physician fringe 65–80K
Insurance 50K Insurance 50K
Physician fringe 75–90K Physician fringe 75–90K
Information
technology
Total=100K Total=100K Total=90K
Information
technology/patient
safety/quality
monitoring:
Purchase/lease/setup
of electronic
health record and
quality
monitoring system
35K
Information
technology/patient
safety/quality
monitoring:
Purchase/lease/
setup of
electronic health
record and quality
monitoring system 35K
Information
technology/patient
safety/quality
monitoring:
Purchase/lease/setup
of electronic health
record and quality
monitoring system
35K
Data manager 65K Data manager 65K .85 Data manager 55K
Annual physician
performance bonus
for meeting mutually
established goals
50k 50k 35k
*The authors are not proposing a specific formula but rather putting forth the principle that it is possible to design many global compensation models that
would provide adequate resources to ensure comprehensive, coordinated care to patients.
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prehensive payment makes available the financial resources for
“tooling-up.” Those primary care practices unsure of being able
to make the transition directly to the comprehensive payment
system might prefer more evolutionary steps (see below).
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, AND IMPLICATIONS
This payment reform proposal represents an attempt to realign
compensation with the primary care mission, providing com-
prehensive payment for comprehensive care. It frees practices
from the growing inadequacy, irrationality, and administrative
burdens of the existing RBRVS-based payment sys-
tem,
3,23,28,49–51 uncoupling primary care compensation from
that of proceduralists, eliminating the zero-sum budgeting
game, and overcoming the constraints of a payment system
favoring procedure-based care. The model makes possible new
payment rules better tailored to the primary care mission and
more enabling of practice transformation. It has the potential to
establish a new social contract, correcting chronic underpay-
ment in return for accountability and achieving important
health outcomes. It acknowledges in explicit financial terms the
value primary care can create when properly organized and
delivered, an obviously important factor in attracting new
physicians to the field and stimulating practice transformation.
Proposing a comprehensive, aggregate payment is likely to
evoke memories of primary care capitation with its pejorative
connotations; however, there are important differences (Ta-
ble 2), which lead us to avoid using the term “capitation” to
describe our system. The most important differences are risk/
needs-adjustment, paying for performance to guard against
underservice, and budgeting sufficient monies to support
teams and infrastructures. These features are essential to
avoiding the withholding of necessary care and the shunning of
complex patients that too often occurred under the capitation
initiatives of the past decade.
25–27 In the new model, the
gatekeeping of capitation is replaced by coordination and
advocacy. Financial risk is borne predominantly by payers,
who have the requisite actuarial and capital resources. None-
theless, practices remain financially accountable, having to
work within a global budget, adhere to professional standards
of care and referral, and eliminate waste and inefficiency.
This model has some similarities and important differences
with salaried models (Table 2). Like salaried models, there is no
incentive to inflate the volume of face-to-face visits, but
salaried models often have lacked the element of a social
contract between the personal physician and the patient,
supported in our model by a patient contribution to the
retainer. In salaried environments, physicians tend to consider
the organization as having the principal accountability to the
patient; this has been reflected in lower patient trust of the
individual physician.
52–54
Risk adjustment is a key element of our payment model,
both for determining the size of the aggregate monthly
payment and for setting pay-for-performance goals. The first
operational models of risk/needs adjustment (referred to as
“case-mix adjustments”) were diagnosis-based and validated
for ambulatory care.
55 Because primary care consists largely of
ambulatory services, risk adjustment based on diagnoses is
likely to be a reasonable approach to predicting the subse-
quent need for primary care services. Further iterations of risk
adjustment by diagnosis have been operational for modifying
payments at the health plan level
56 and, if modified for
application to the practice level, they should facilitate match-
ing payment to care burden. Existing models based on
diagnoses
57–59 would seem a good fit for the payment system
we have outlined. As noted earlier, a validated risk-adjustment
framework that incorporates the full spectrum of important
risk determinants, including those accounting for patient
behaviors
45 will be needed.
In a cost-conscious society, it is unlikely that the new
payment model will be adopted widely if it is viewed as a give-
away to primary care physicians/practices. Conversely, pri-
mary care physicians are likely to reject the model if it appears
to be yet another attempt to use them as gatekeepers or
insurance companies. Our model tries to avoid both pitfalls by
assigning most of the financial/actuarial risk to insurers while
recognizing the responsibility of primary care practices to be
financially and clinically accountable.
To put the financial challenge posed by the model in
perspective, it is useful to consider the changes in total health
spending that might result from implementation of our
payment system and the savings that would be needed to
offset them. Physician services currently constitute approxi-
mately 25% of all national spending for personal health
services; of that amount, depending on the demographics of
the population served, a quarter to a third constitutes payment
for primary care services
60. Thus, only 6–8% of total spending
for personal health services currently represents payments to
primary care physicians. If we propose a modest comprehen-
sive payment schedule (e.g., an average of $500 per patient per
year; see Table 1), it would immediately increase total spending
by 2–3%, necessitating a 3%+ reduction in the remaining 88–
90% of personal health care spending to offset the increase.
Current estimates of wasteful spending are as high as 30%
of total expenditures.
61 Studies of electronic medical record
systems with decision-support capacity (an essential feature of
our payment/practice reform model) have demonstrated sub-
stantial savings from reductions in medical errors, pharmacy
costs, adverse drug events, unnecessary radiology and labora-
tory utilization, and avoidable hospital admissions.
33–36 Addi-
tional cost savings in care of the frail elderly are a reasonable
expectation from improvements in coordination of care,
30–32
particularly among the 30% of Medicare beneficiaries who
have 4 or more chronic conditions and account for almost 80%
of annual program spending.
62 Even if our transformed
primary care practices eventually achieve only a small fraction
of the potential savings, that amount should offset the 2–3%
projected increase in costs. Determining financial impact is a
critical reason to test the model in pilot study.
In the short run, budget neutrality is unlikely and should
not be expected, because upfront investments in practice
reorganization and systems will take time to generate the
expected savings. Nonetheless, the comprehensive payment
model should provide readily apparent early benefits: First and
foremost, patients (especially the elderly and the complexly ill)
should notice improved access to care made possible by
improvements in staffing, scheduling, and infrastructure
(unlike concierge practices, which rely heavily on reducing
panel size to improve access.
63,64 With team practice freeing up
the primary physician to perform more thorough patient
evaluations, there should be less resorting to otherwise
unnecessary tests and referrals. Other early benefits should
413 Goroll et al.: Comprehensive Payment for Comprehensive Adult Primary Care JGIMinclude those mentioned earlier associated with implementa-
tion of the electronic health record.
35–37 Rapid improvement in
care is possible, as suggested by results in the first year of
implementing an ambitious pay-for-performance bonus pro-
gram for British general practitioners.
65
Administrative burden has been a major criticism of the
RBRVS system.
28,49–51 Implementation of our model would
eliminate claims billing and receiving as well as the onerous
documentation and coding requirements associated with
RBRVS, supplanting these purely administrative activities with
more clinically relevant assessments of practice operations,
patient panels, and clinical outcomes. By insisting on an
electronic administrative/clinical infrastructure for practice
participation in this payment reform, the model makes
possible automated audits that should be less disruptive and
lower in cost than the administrative demands of RBRVS.
Despite the expected lessening of administrative burden, the
benefits will not be realized until an electronic health record
has been installed, which can be daunting for a small primary
care practice, necessitating careful transition planning and
budgeting for the changeover.
There is potential for abuses with this model, including
misallocation of the comprehensive payment, gaming of the
risk/needs-adjustment process, and “dumping” of care onto
specialists. These require built-in countermeasures. Siphoning
off payments targeted for team salaries and information
infrastructure to enrich physician pay can be avoided by
developing disbursement guidelines (e.g., Tables 1 and 3) and
measures, which can be audited periodically. Use of validated
objective measures of risk and need (e.g., principal diagnoses,
ejection fraction, creatinine clearance, patterns of care utiliza-
tion), and independent, random audits of the practice’s
electronic health record database should minimize chances of
manipulating the risk-adjustment process. Dumping can be
reduced by mandating sharing or outright transfer of the
comprehensive payment when the specialist assumes most of
the responsibility for care and by profiling the referral patterns
of physicians, making payment adjustments where overrefer-
rals are occurring. A payment that is adequately risk-adjusted
is in itself a powerful disincentive to inappropriate transfer of
patients to a specialist. Underutilization of referrals should be
discouraged by the clinical outcomes and patient-experience
components of our bonus payment determination.
An unintended consequence of this model’s implementation
might be practice downsizing. Practices that grew excessively
large to meet expenses under fee for service might be tempted
to “right-size” their panels to improve care and qualify for
performance bonuses (see Table 2). If widely adopted, this
could paradoxically reduce access for some
64 and trigger a
temporary shortage of primary care physicians. Alternatively,
the expanded primary care team made possible by our model
provides a means of devoting more attention to patients
without the need to downsize (which can be painful for both
patients and physicians). Moreover, by eliminating the disin-
centive to care for the complexly ill and needy, we are likely to
improve access for those who need it most. With income
independent of visit volume, smart delivery strategies (e.g.,
team care, interoperable medical records, email access, group
visits, web-based patient education) can be implemented to
reduce individual physician and team workloads, leaving more
time for high-value face-to-face encounters, even home visits.
Any shortage of primary care physicians that results from
initial implementation of our model should be short-lived, as
medical school graduates are attracted to the field by the
promise of a financially secure, professionally satisfying career
and practice environment.
Debate over implementation strategies will be vigorous. The
potential for practice and system disruptions from payment
reform cause some to argue for incremental approaches, such
as increasing the valuation of RBRVS evaluation and manage-
ment codes or adding a supplemental case management
payment for care of high-risk patients.
28,48 However, recent
experience with capitation showed that if fee-for-service (e.g.,
under a modified form of RBRVS) continues, then even a
comprehensive payment for some patients in a predominantly
fee-for-service environment may not alter behavior; practices
continue to reward “productivity” (as defined by number of
patients seen and procedures performed) rather than develop
other performance measures.
66–68 Adding pay-for-perfor-
mance to fee-for-service might help counter this behavior, but
comprehensive pay for comprehensive care has the potential to
be a more straightforward and effective approach to achieving
the desired outcomes. Comparative studies are needed.
Primary care in the United States stands at a crossroads. We
believe taking the road to recovery requires fundamental
reform. It is urgent that new models of payment and practice
be developed, tested, and implemented.
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